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Abstract: We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is
concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group
of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average
rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always
exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the
two types of status as being substitutable.
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1. Introduction
The dependence of an agent’s utility on the identity of the members of his or her coalition was
recognized in the seminal paper of [1], and formally introduced as a hedonic coalition formation game
by [2,3]. The model consists of two components, namely, a finite set of players and a preference relation
for each player defined over the coalitions that a player may belong to. The outcome of such a game is a
partition of the player set into coalitions called a coalition structure.
In this paper we extend the hedonic coalition formation model by distinguishing between three
different types of players and allowing for agents’ preferences to be type-dependent. Our model can
also be seen as an extension of the three-sided matching model in which agents’ preferences are defined
over subsets of players from all possible players’ types. Within this framework, we study the existence
of coalition structures that are immune against coalitional deviations.
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As it is well known (cf. [4–9]), one needs strong restrictions on agents’ preferences even for the
standard three-sided matching model to assure that a stable three-sided matching exists. Therefore, it is
not surprising that in the more general game we consider, suitable preference restrictions are needed to
show the existence of a core stable coalition structure. In particular, we assume players’ preferences to
be based on the substitutability between local and global status that an agent attains in the corresponding
coalitions (cf. [10,11]). In this framework, we show that if global status is weighted in a balanced way,
then a core stable coalition structure always exists.
2. Notation and Definitions
Let Na, N b, and N c be three disjoint and finite sets of agents of type a, b, and c, respectively. For
each player i ∈ N := Na ∪ N b ∪ N c we denote by Ni = {X ⊆ N | i ∈ X} the collection of all
coalitions containing i. A partition pi of N is called a coalition structure. For each coalition structure
pi and each player i ∈ N , we denote by pi(i) the coalition in pi containing player i, i.e., pi(i) ∈ pi and
i ∈ pi(i). Further, we assume that each player i ∈ N is endowed with a preference i over Ni, i.e.,
a binary relation over Ni which is reflexive, complete, and transitive. Denote by i and ∼i the strict
and indifference relation associated with i and by := (1,2, . . . ,n) a profile of preferences i
for all i ∈ N . A player’s preference relation over coalitions canonically induces a preference relation
over coalition structures in the following way: For any two coalition structures pi and pi′, player i weakly
prefers pi to pi′ if and only if he weakly prefers “his” coalition in pi to the one in pi′, i.e., pi ′i pi if and
only if pi(i) ′i pi(i). Hence, we assume that players’ preferences over coalition structures are purely
hedonic. That means, they are completely characterized by their preferences over coalitions. Finally, a
hedonic game (N,) is a pair consisting of the set of players and a preference profile. Given a hedonic
game (N,), a coalition structure pi of N is core stable if there does not exist a nonempty coalition X
such that X i pi(i) holds for each i ∈ X .
3. Balanced Weights and Status-Based Preferences
Let |Na| = na,
∣∣N b∣∣ = nb, and |N c| = nc with na ≤ nb ≤ nc. We assume that every agent
id ∈ Na ∪ N b ∪ N c is assigned a rank rid which induces a unique ordering of agents within each type
such that any two consecutive players’ ranks differ by one unit. The highest ranked agents of each type
all have rank nc, and the lowest ranked agents in the sets Na, N b, and N c have ranks nc − na + 1,
nc − nb + 1, and 1, respectively. We take the rank of the empty set to be equal to zero. Underlying the
ranking of agents may be a distribution of abilities or material endowment. By letting the highest ranked
agents of all types have equal ranks we rule out scale effects. The assumption that the lowest ranked
a-agent may have a higher rank than the lowest ranked b- and c-agent reflects the scarcity of a-type
individuals relative to those of b- and c-types.
In addition to his preference ia , each agent ia ∈ Na is characterized by a non-negative weight
vector
(
wbia , w
c
ia
)
. The corresponding vectors for ib ∈ N b and ic ∈ N c are (wa
ib
, wc
ib
)
and
(
waic , w
b
ic
)
,
respectively. We call these weights balanced if the following two conditions hold:
(1) for each ia ∈ Na, ib ∈ N b, and ic ∈ N c : wbia + wcia = waib + wcib = waic + wbic = 1.
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(2) for each d ∈ {a, b, c}, and all id′ ∈ Nd′ and id′′ ∈ Nd′′ with d′, d′′ ∈ {a, b, c} \ {d}, d′ 6= d′′ :
wd
id
′ + wdid′′ = 1.
One possible interpretation of such a restriction on the weights is as follows. Each agent has exactly
one unit of communication time that is efficiently allocated between the other two types of groups, as
reflected in (1). Similarly, condition (2) imposes that the communication time of agents of two different
types with agents of the third type sums up to one. It follows from the balancedness condition that
assigning a value to some wd
id′ , d 6= d′, determines also the rest of the weights. For instance, if we fix
wbia ∈ [0, 1], then (1) and (2) imply wbia = wcib = waic and 1 − wbia = wcia = wbic = waib .1 Thus, this
condition inherits and strengthens the spirit of cyclicity from the standard three-sided matching model
(cf. [5]).
By using the above setup, let us now define agents’ preferences in a hedonic game with status-based
preferences and balanced weights. For d ∈ {a, b, c}, each id ∈ Nd and each X, Y ∈ Nid , X id Y if
and only if
rid −
∑
i∈X∩Nd ri
|X ∩Nd| +
∑
d′∈{a,b,c}\{d}
wd
′
id ·
∑
i∈X∩Nd′ ri
|X ∩Nd′| ≥ rid −
∑
i∈Y ∩Nd ri
|Y ∩Nd| +
∑
d′∈{a,b,c}\{d}
wd
′
id ·
∑
i∈Y ∩Nd′ ri
|Y ∩Nd′|
Thus, in such a hedonic game, each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative
rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted
sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups (cf. [11]). Moreover, each agent perceives the
two types of status as being substitutable.
Theorem 1 Let (N,) be a hedonic game with status-based preferences and balanced weights. Then
the set of core stable coalition structures is non-empty.
Consider the coalition structure pi = {N}. We will show that pi is core stable.
Let Y ⊆ N and d ∈ {a, b, c}. In what follows we will denote by rd (Y ) (rd (Y )) the rank of the
highest (lowest) ranked d-agent in Y .
First, for all d ∈ {a, b, c} we have by construction that∑
id∈Nd rid
|Nd| =
rd(N
d) + rd
(
Nd
)
2
In addition, since the highest ranked agents in all types have the same rank and the weights are balanced,
we have for the status of agent id ∈ Nd in the coalition structure pi = {N} that
rid −
∑
i∈Nd ri
|Nd| +
∑
d′∈{a,b,c}\{d}
wd
′
id ·
∑
i∈Nd′ ri
|Nd′ |
= rid −
rd(N
d) + rd
(
Nd
)
2
+
∑
d′∈{a,b,c}\{d}
wd
′
id ·
rd′(N
d′) + rd
′ (
Nd
′)
2
= rid −
rd(N
d)
2
− r
d
(
Nd
)
2
+
∑
d′∈{a,b,c}\{d}
wd
′
id ·
rd′(N
d′)
2
+
∑
d′∈{a,b,c}\{d}
wd
′
id ·
rd
′ (
Nd
′)
2
= rid −
rd(N
d)
2
+
∑
d′∈{a,b,c}\{d}
wd
′
id ·
rd′(N
d′)
2
1We thank one anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Next, we will show that there is no coalition X ⊆ N that blocks the constructed coalition structure pi.
Suppose, on the contrary, that such a coalition exists.
First, suppose that X ⊆ Nd for some d ∈ {a, b, c}. Let j be the lowest ranked member of X . This
agent’s status in X is given by
rj −
∑
k∈X rk
|X| ≤ 0
The same agent’s status in pi, however, is given by
rj − rd(N
d)
2
+
∑
d′∈{a,b,c}\{d}
wd
′
id ·
rd′(N
d′)
2
> 0
This establishes a contradiction to X blocking pi.
Suppose next that agents of all the types are contained in X and let X ∩Na = A, X ∩N b = B, and
X ∩N c = C. Then, for ia ∈ A, ib ∈ B, and ic ∈ C one should have
ria −
∑
i∈A ri
|A| + w
b
ia ·
∑
j∈B rj
|B| + w
c
ia ·
∑
k∈C rk
|C| > ria −
ra(N
a)
2
+ wbia ·
rb(N
b)
2
+ wcia ·
rc(N
c)
2
,
rib −
∑
j∈B rj
|B| + w
a
ib
·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| + w
c
ib
·
∑
k∈C rk
|C| > rib −
rb(N
b)
2
+ wa
ib
· ra(N
a)
2
+ wc
ib
· rc(N
c)
2
,
ric −
∑
k∈C rk
|C| + w
a
ic ·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| + w
b
ic ·
∑
j∈B rj
|B| > ric −
rc(N
c)
2
+ waic ·
ra(N
a)
2
+ wbic ·
rb(N
b)
2
Summing up, we get∑
i∈A ri
|A| +
∑
j∈B rj
|B| +
∑
k∈C rk
|C| < (1− w
a
ib − waic) ·
ra(N
a)
2
+
(
1− wbia − wbic
) · rb(N b)
2
+(1− wcia − wcib) ·
rc(N
c)
2
+ (waib + w
a
ic) ·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| +
(
wbia + w
b
ic
) · ∑j∈B rj|B|
+ (wcia + w
c
ib) ·
∑
k∈C rk
|C|
Since the weights are balanced, we have∑
i∈A ri
|A| +
∑
j∈B rj
|B| +
∑
k∈C rk
|C| <
∑
i∈A ri
|A| +
∑
j∈B rj
|B| +
∑
k∈C rk
|C|
which is a contradiction.
Take finally the case where X contains two agents’ types, say a and b, and let X ∩ Na = A and
X ∩N b = B. As X is a blocking coalition, one should have for ia ∈ A and ib ∈ B that
ria −
∑
i∈A ri
|A| + w
b
ia ·
∑
j∈B rj
|B| > ria −
ra(N
a)
2
+ wbia ·
rb(N
b)
2
+ wcia ·
rc(N
c)
2
,
rib −
∑
j∈B rj
|B| + w
a
ib
·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| > rib −
rb(N
b)
2
+ wa
ib
· ra(N
a)
2
+ wc
ib
· rc(N
c)
2
Summing up, and applying the balancedness of the weights, we get
(1− waib) ·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| +
(
1− wbia
) · ∑j∈B rj|B| < (1− waib) · ra(Na)2 + (1− wbia) · rb(N b)2 − rc(N c)2
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Since wa
ib
, wbia ∈ [0, 1],
∑
i∈A ri
|A| ≥ ra(Na), and
∑
j∈B rj
|B| ≥ rb(N b), we have again a contradiction. We
conclude that X cannot block pi = {N}.
Next we study in more detail the core stable outcomes when there is an equal number of a-, b-, and
c-type of agents. For this, we need to introduce some new notation. Let d ∈ {a, b, c}. We denote by
r
pi(id)
id
the status that agent id ∈ Nd attains in a coalition structure pi, i.e.,
r
pi(id)
id
:= rid −
∑
i∈pi(id)∩Nd ri
|pi(id) ∩Nd| +
∑
d′∈{a,b,c}\{d}
wd
′
id ·
∑
i∈pi(id)∩Nd′ ri
|pi(id) ∩Nd′ |
Furthermore, we define the set Π :=
{
pi : r
pi(i)
i ≥ ri for all i ∈ N
}
and note that Π 6= ∅ as, for instance,
the coalition structure
{{
ia, ib, ic
}
ria=rib=ric
}
belongs to Π when |Na| = |N b| = |N c|.
Theorem 2 Let (N,) be a hedonic game with status-based preferences and balanced weights, and
|Na| = |N b| = |N c|. If pi ∈ Π, then pi is core stable.
Proof. Take pi ∈ Π and suppose that there is a coalition X that blocks pi.
Consider first the case where X contains only one type of agents. Then, one should have
ri −
∑
j∈X rj
|X| > r
pi(i)
i ≥ ri
which is a contradiction. Thus, X cannot be blocking pi.
Suppose next thatX contains two agents’ types, say a and b (considering other two agents’ types does
not alter the proof argument), and let X ∩Na = A and X ∩N b = B. For ia ∈ A and ib ∈ B one should
then have
ria −
∑
i∈A ri
|A| + w
b
ia ·
∑
j∈B rj
|B| > r
pi(ia)
ia ≥ ria , rib −
∑
j∈B rj
|B| + w
a
ib ·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| > r
pi(ib)
ib
≥ rib
Summing up, we get
waib ·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| + w
b
ia ·
∑
j∈B rj
|B| >
∑
i∈A ri
|A| +
∑
j∈B rj
|B|
which is a contradiction since wa
ib
, wbia ∈ [0, 1] .
Take finally the case where agents of all the types are contained in X and let X ∩Na = A, X ∩N b =
B, and X ∩N c = C. Then, one should have
ria −
∑
i∈A ri
|A| + w
b
ia ·
∑
j∈B rj
|B| + w
c
ia ·
∑
k∈C rk
|C| > r
pi(ia)
ia ≥ ria ,
rib −
∑
j∈B rj
|B| + w
a
ib
·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| + w
c
ib
·
∑
k∈C rk
|C| > r
pi(ib)
ib
≥ rib ,
ric −
∑
k∈C rk
|C| + w
a
ic ·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| + w
b
ic ·
∑
j∈B rj
|B| > r
pi(ic)
ic ≥ ric
Summing up, we get
(waib + w
a
ic) ·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| +
(
wbia + w
b
ic
) · ∑j∈B rj|B| + (wcia + wcib) ·
∑
k∈C rk
|C|
>
∑
i∈A ri
|A| +
∑
j∈B rj
|B| +
∑
k∈C rk
|C|
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which is again a contradiction since the weights are balanced. We conclude that pi is core stable.
Notice that the reverse implication of Theorem 2 does not hold as the following example shows.
Example 1 Consider Nd = {1d, 2d, 3d} for each d ∈ {a, b, c}. The agents are ranked as follows:
r1d = 1, r2d = 2, and r3d = 3 for each d ∈ {a, b, c}. Let the weight vector be such that
wd
′
id
= 0.5 for all id ∈ Nd with d, d′ ∈ {a, b, c}, d′ 6= d. Consider the coalition structure
pi = {{1a}, {2a, 1b, 1c}, {3a, 2b, 3b, 2c, 3c}}. It is easy to compute the status of each agent in pi:
r
pi(1a)
1a = 0, r
pi(2a)
2a = 1, r
pi(3a)
3a = 2.5, r
pi(1b)
1b
= r
pi(1c)
1c = 1.5, r
pi(2b)
2b
= r
pi(2c)
2c = 2.25, and
r
pi(3b)
3b
= r
pi(3c)
3c = 3.25. We will show that pi is core stable.
As every agent’s status in pi is at least as high as when being alone, no agent can block pi by himself.
Moreover, it is clear from the proof of Theorem 1 that there cannot be a blocking coalition X ⊆ Nd with
|X| ≥ 2 for any d ∈ {a, b, c} (the status of the lowest ranked member of X is non-positive).
Furthermore, notice that r
pi(id)
id
> rid for all id ∈ Nd with d ∈ {b, c}. Suppose, by contradiction, that
there is a blocking coalition X ⊆ N b ∪ N c with X ∩ N b = B 6= ∅ and X ∩ N c = C 6= ∅. Therefore,
there must be agents ib, ic ∈ X for whom
rib −
∑
j∈B rj
|B| + 0.5 ·
∑
k∈C rk
|C| > r
pi(ib)
ib
> rib
ric −
∑
k∈C rk
|C| + 0.5 ·
∑
j∈B rj
|B| > r
pi(ic)
ic > ric
Summing up, we get −0.5 ·
(∑
j∈B rj
|B| +
∑
k∈C rk
|C|
)
> 0. This leads to a contradiction as a group’s
average rank is strictly positive.
Next, suppose thatX ⊆ Na∪N b withX∩Na = A 6= ∅ andX∩N b = B 6= ∅. One can show that if pi
is blocked byX , then for an agent ib ∈ B, it must hold that rib−
∑
j∈B rj
|B| +0.5 ·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| > r
pi(ib)
ib
> rib ,
which implies that 0.5 ·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| >
∑
j∈B rj
|B| . This is only satisfied in the case when
∑
j∈B rj
|B| = 1 and∑
i∈A ri
|A| ∈ {2.5, 3}, i.e., we have A ∈ {{2
a, 3a} , {3a}}. Notice that if A = {2a, 3a}, then agent 2a
has no incentive to participate in X as his ranking in this case would be 2 − 2.5 + 0.5 · 1 = 1 which
equals his ranking in the partition pi. Analogously, if A = {3a}, then the ranking of 3a in X would be
3− 3 + 0.5 · 1 = 0.5 < 2.5 = rpi(3a)3a , i.e., agent 3a has no incentive to participate in X either. Similarly,
one can show that there is no coalition X ⊆ Na ∪ N c with X ∩ Na 6= ∅ and X ∩ N c 6= ∅ which
blocks pi.
Last, suppose that there is a blocking coalition X with X ∩ Na = A 6= ∅, X ∩ N b = B 6= ∅ and
X ∩N b = C 6= ∅. Consider an agent ib ∈ B and an agent ic ∈ C. If pi is blocked by X , this implies that
rib −
∑
j∈B rj
|B| + 0.5 ·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| + 0.5 ·
∑
k∈C rk
|C| > r
pi(ib)
ib
ric −
∑
k∈C rk
|C| + 0.5 ·
∑
i∈A ri
|A| + 0.5 ·
∑
j∈B rj
|B| > r
pi(ic)
ic
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Summing up, we get
∑
i∈A ri
|A| > 0.5 ·
∑
j∈B rj
|B| + 0.5 ·
∑
k∈C rk
|C| + (r
pi(ib)
ib
− rib) + (rpi(i
c)
ic − ric). As∑
j∈B rj
|B| ≥ 1,
∑
k∈C rk
|C| ≥ 1, r
pi(ib)
ib
−rib ≥ 0.25, and rpi(i
c)
ic −ric ≥ 0.25, this implies that
∑
i∈A ri
|A| > 1.5.
Notice finally that, for X to block pi, one should have for each ia ∈ A that
ria −
∑
i∈A ri
|A| + 0.5 ·
∑
j∈B rj
|B| + 0.5 ·
∑
k∈C rk
|C| > r
pi(ia)
ia
Using
∑
i∈A ri
|A| > 0.5 ·
∑
j∈B rj
|B| + 0.5 ·
∑
k∈C rk
|C| + 0.5, we get ria − 0.5 > r
pi(ia)
ia for each i
a ∈ A. This
implies that 3a 6∈ A. In addition, recall that
∑
i∈A ri
|A| > 1.5. Since 3
a 6∈ A, this implies that 1a 6∈ A,
hence, A = {2a}. Therefore, 1b 6∈ B and 1c 6∈ C, which in turn implies that B = ∅ and C = ∅ as no
agent among 2b, 3b, 2c and 3c can obtain a higher status.
Let us finally consider a hedonic game with status-based preferences and individual weights that are
defined on coalitions and are, therefore, not balanced. As our last example shows, a core stable coalition
structure may fail to exist in this case.
Example 2 Let Nd = {1d, 2d} for d ∈ {a, b, c}. Let r1d = 1 and r2d = 2 for all d ∈ {a, b, c}. Consider
the following non-balanced weight vector:
1a : w
{1c}
1a = 1/2, w
{2b}
1a = 2/3, w
{1c2c}
1a = w
{2c}
1a = 1, w
{1b}
1a = 3/2, w
{1b2b}
1a = 4;
2a : w
{1b}
2a = 1/2, w
{2b}
2a = w
{1c}
2a = w
{1c2c}
2a = 1, w
{2c}
2a = w
{1b2b}
2a = 2;
1b : w
{2a}
1b
= 1/2, w
{2c}
1b
= 9/10, w
{1a}
1b
= w
{1c2c}
1b
= 1, w
{1c}
1b
= 3/2, w
{1a2a}
1b
= 3;
2b : w
{1c}
2b
= w
{2a}
2b
= 1/2, w
{1a2a}
2b
= w
{1c2c}
2b
= 1, w
{1a}
2b
= w
{2c}
2b
= 2;
1c : w
{1a}
1c = w
{2b}
1c = 0, w
{1b}
1c = w
{2a}
1c = 1/2, w
{1a2a}
1c = w
{1b2b}
1c = 1;
2c : w
{2a}
2c = w
{2b}
2c = w
{1a2a}
2c = w
{1b2b}
2c = 1, w
{1b}
2c = 3, w
{1a}
2c = 10/3
We will show that there is no core stable coalition structure.
First, consider coalition structure pi1 = {Na ∪ N b ∪ N c}. The status of each player in the given
coalition structure can be computed easily: rpi1(1
a)
1a = 7, r
pi1(2a)
2a = 5, r
pi1(1b)
1b
= 11/2, rpi1(2
b)
2b
= 7/2,
r
pi1(1c)
1c = 5/2, and r
pi1(2c)
2c = 7/2. This coalition structure can be blocked by coalition {2a, 2b, 2c} in which
the blocking players 2a, 2b, 2c can obtain status of 6, 5, and 4, respectively, by forming a coalition.
Similarly, one can show that coalition structures {{1a, 2a, 1b, 1c}, {2b, 2c}},
{{1a, 2a, 1c}, {1b, 2b, 2c}}, {{1a, 2a, 2c}, {1b, 2b, 1c}}, {{1a, 1b, 2b}, {2a, 1c, 2c}},
{1a, 1b, 2b, 1c}, {2a, 2c}} and {{2a, 1b, 2b, 1c}, {1a, 2c}} can be blocked by {2a, 2b, 2c}.
Next, consider coalition structure pi2 = {{1a, 1b, 1c}, {2a, 2b, 2c}}. The status of players 1a, 1b, and 1c
in this coalition structure is 2, 5/2, and 1/2, respectively. The status of players 2a, 2b and 2c is given above.
Coalition structure pi2 is blocked by 1a, 2band 2c who can form a coalition and obtain status of 10/3, 6,
and 16/3.
Similarly, one can show that coalition structures {{1a, 2a, 1b, 1c, 2c}, {2b}}, {{1a, 2b, 1c}, {2a, 1b, 2c},
{{2a, 1b, 2b, 1c, 2c}, {1a}}, {{1a, 1b}, {2a, 2b, 1c, 2c}} and {{1a, 2a, 1b, 2c}, {2b, 1c}} can be blocked by
coalition {1a, 2b, 2c}.
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Next, consider coalition structure pi3 = {{1a, 2b, 2c}, {2a, 1b, 1c}}. The status of players 2a, 1b, and
1c in this coalition structure is 3/2, 5/2, and 3/2, respectively, and the status of the remainder of the players
is given above. This coalition structure is blocked by coalition {1a, 1b, 2c} where the members obtain a
higher status of 7/2, 28/10, and 19/3.
Similarly, one can show that coalition structures {{1a, 2a, 2b, 1c, 2c}, {1b}},
{{2a, 1b, 2b, 2c}, {1a, 1c}}, {{1a, 2b}, {2a, 1b, 1c, 2c}} and {{1a, 2a, 2b, 2c}, {1b, 1c}} are blocked
by {1a, 1b, 2c}.
Next, consider coalition structure pi4 = {{1a, 1b, 2c}, {2a, 2b, 1c}}. Players’ status is rpi4(1
a)
1a = 7/2,
r
pi4(2a)
2a = 3, r
pi4(1b)
1b
= 28/10, rpi4(2
b)
2b
= 3/2, rpi4(1
c)
1c = 1, and r
pi4(2c)
2c = 19/3. This coalition structure
is blocked by players 1a, 2a, 1b, 2b who can obtain status 11/2, 7/2, 4, and 2, respectively, by forming a
coalition.
Similarly, one can show that coalition structures {{1a, 1b, 1c, 2c}, {2a, 2b}} and
{{1a, 2a, 2b}, {1b, 1c, 2c}} are blocked by {1a, 2a, 1b, 2b}.
Next, consider coalition structure pi5 = {{1a, 2a, 1b, 2b}, {1c}, {2c}}. Note that rpi5(1
c)
1c = r
pi5(2c)
2c = 0.
This coalition structure is blocked by the grand coalition, pi1.
Similarly, one can easily show that coalition structures {{1b, 2b, 1c, 2c}, {1a}, {2a}},{{1a, 2a, 2b, 1c}, {1b, 2c}} and {{1a, 2a, 1c, 2c}, {1b}, {2b}} are blocked by the grand coalition.
Consider coalition structures pi6 = {{1a, 1b, 2b, 1c, 2c}, {2a}} where rpi6(1
a)
1a = 15/2, r
pi6(2a)
2a = 0,
r
pi6(1b)
1b
= 2, rpi6(2
b)
2b
= 4, rpi6(1
c)
1c = 1, and r
pi6(2c)
2c = 16/3. This coalition structure is blocked by {2a, 1b, 1c}
whose members can obtain status of 3/2, 5/2 and 3/2, respectively.
Similarly, we can show that coalition structure {{1a, 1b, 2b, 2c}, {2a, 1c}} can be blocked by coalition
{2a, 1b, 2c}.
In all of the remainder of the coalition structures a blocking coalition can be found easily. There is
either at least one player who forms a blocking coalition by himself, e.g., consider coalition structure
{{1a, 2b, 1c, 2c}, {2a, 1b}} where the status of player 1c is−1/2; or there are at lest two players of distinct
types who have status of 0 and by forming a coalition obtain strictly higher status, e.g., consider coalition
structure {{2a, 2b, 2c}, {1a}, {1b}, {1c}} where players 1a, 1b and 1c have 0 status and can obtain strictly
positive status by forming coalition {1a, 1b, 1c}.
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